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This article is a collective response to Anthony Burke et al’s ‘Planet Politics’, 
published in this journal in 2016, and billed as a ‘Manifesto from the end of IR’. We 
dispute this claim on the basis that rather than breaking from the discipline, the 
Manifesto provides a problematic global governance agenda which is dangerously 
authoritarian and deeply depoliticising. We substantiate this analysis in the claim 
that Burke et al reproduce an already failed and discredited liberal cosmopolitan 
framework through the advocacy of managerialism rather than transformation; the 
top-down coercive approach of international law; and use of abstract modernist 
political categories. In the closing sections of the article, we discuss the possibility of 
different approaches, which, taking the Anthropocene as both an epistemological 
and ontological break with modernist assumptions, could take us beyond IR’s 
disciplinary confines. 
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Writing in the Prison Notebooks Gramsci described the moment as an ‘interregnum’ 
where many ‘morbid symptoms’ were evident. Whether we are now in an 
interregnum or not could be a point for debate, but we appear to be surrounded by 
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many ‘morbid symptoms’.1 Within the human sphere, these are taking the form of 
political violence and an increased rhetorical violence amongst those who represent 
us. Looking out into the rest of nature there is the day-by-day drip-feed of news 
reporting on the devastation of our fellow species and landscapes, much linked to 
the issue of climate chaos.  
 
It is to these latter manifestations that Anthony Burke, Stefanie Fishel, Audra 
Mitchell, Simon Dalby, and Daniel Levine (hereafter Burke et al) in particular draw 
our attention in their call for a ‘Planet Politics’, which they consider to be a 
‘manifesto from the end of IR’.2 Their Manifesto comprises three main elements: a 
detailed re-statement of the ecological crisis that we confront, very closely linked to 
the notion of the Anthropocene; a critique of the discipline of International 
Relations; and finally, some, more or less, practical suggestions. That there is an 
ecological crisis, with possible civilisation threatening potential, and that the 
discipline of International Relations finds itself ill-equipped to engage with the issue 
are points on which we can find ourselves in agreement.  
 
Where we find ourselves in disagreement is with much of the analysis, logic, and 
proposals and, as a result, we feel compelled to write this article by way of a 
response. As Gramsci highlighted, it is not easy to break from traditional frameworks 
of thinking, despite there being a barrier to critical engagement in the present. The 
authors of the Manifesto themselves state that, ‘Trying to write from within IR, we 
find ourselves prisoners in our own vocation’, noting that they leave for others the 
task of future research to ‘set out the ontological or programmatic weaknesses of 
the field of International Relations in the face of the Anthropocene’.3 Here, we 
                                            
1 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London, Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1978), 275-276. 
2Anthony Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics: A Manifesto from the End of IR’, Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 44, no. 3 (2016): 499-523. 
3 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 502; 522. 
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suggest that the claim that Burke et al speak ‘from the end of IR’ serves to obscure 
exactly what might be at stake in engaging seriously with the Anthropocene.  
 
It is perhaps ironic that, while rhetorically appealing to a range of critical 
perspectives and empirical concerns, the methodological framing and programmatic 
statements of the Manifesto slip easily into the traditional concerns and 
perspectives of the discipline, especially those rehearsed in the 1990s by the liberal 
internationalist theorists of cosmopolitan democracy. 4  In the introduction, the 
authors lay out their understanding of the problematic posed sharply by the 
Anthropocene: 
 
We contend that International Relations has failed because the planet does 
not match and cannot be clearly seen by its institutional and 
disciplinaryframeworks. Institutionally and legally, it is organised around a 
managed anarchy of nation-states, not the collective human interaction with 
the biosphere. Intellectually, the IR discipline is organised sociologically 
around established paradigms and research programmes likewise focused on 
states and the forms of international organisation they will tolerate; it is not 
organised to value or create the conceptual and analytical changes that are 
needed.5 
 
It is clear that their concerns lie with the nation-state based framing of Realism, the 
traditional Cold War paradigm of IR, rather than with liberal internationalist 
attempts to constitute new forms of global governance; exchanging the word 
‘global’ for the word ‘planetary’ is not enough in itself to constitute a conceptual 
difference between the two approaches. There is little that is new or ‘beyond IR’ 
                                            
4 See, for example, David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern 
State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); Daniele Archibugi, 
Debating Cosmopolitics (London: Verso, 2003); Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: 
Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). 
5 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 501. 
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here, anymore than can be found in the critique of ‘methodological nationalism’ 
(mounted by Anthony Giddens, Herminio Martins, Anthony D Smith and others), 
which first arose in the 1970s6 and was popularised by Ulrich Beck, at the end of the 
1990s, with his similarly doom-laden thesis of the ‘world risk society’.7 In their 
Manifesto, Burke et al highlight the danger that critical theorists can very easily 
appear locked in a prison, one of their own making. In this collective response, we 
wish to raise three aspects, which are particularly worrying; putting this danger in 
sharp relief, despite the authors’ conscious intention of making a radical statement 
going beyond IR’s confines.  
 
It is our argument that Burke et al are strongly wedded to a liberal cosmopolitan 
perspective in International Relations. We substantiate this analysis in the following 
three sections, which claim that they reproduce an already failed and discredited 
liberal internationalist framework through: first, seeking amelioration rather than 
transformation; second, advocating top-down coercive approaches of international 
law as an effective mechanism; and third, resorting to abstract, high-flown and 
idealist notions, such as ‘global ethics’. In the closing two sections of the article, we 
discuss the possibility of different approaches which, taking the Anthropocene as 
both an epistemological and ontological break with modernist assumptions, can 
enable scholarship and policy engagements which we see as less likely to reproduce 
the disciplinary constraints of International Relations, as it has been historically 
constituted. 
 
A ‘Manifesto’ without Politics  
 
For a self-proclaimed ‘Manifesto’, there is strangely little in the way of politics. One 
of the most surprising phrases in the text is the view that ‘we need not focus on who 
                                            
6 See, for an overview, Daniel Chernilo, ‘Social theory’s methodological nationalism: 
Myth and reality’, European Journal of Social Theory 9, no. 1 (2006): 5-22.  
7 Beck, What is Globalization? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); ‘The cosmopolitan 
society and its enemies’, Theory, Culture & Society 19, no. 1-2 (2002): 17-44. 
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is responsible, but we do need to learn to adapt to the world we have created’.8 To 
adapt to the world that we have created implies that we are leaving the causes of 
our current problems in place. However, it was difficult to understand how we can 
work towards resolving some of our current challenges (even if that is at the level of 
adaptation) if we lack an analysis of what is the cause of those problems. It’s the 
equivalent of collecting the water that is pouring through the roof rather than trying 
to fix the hole. As many writers have pointed out, we did not stumble into this 
current predicament, and there are a number of starting points for developing an 
analysis of the ecological impacts of the forms that human development have taken, 
including Simon Dalby's own work.9 Relatedly, a major issue that is not considered by 
Burke et al in the Manifesto is the question of global inequality. This is a significant 
oversight, highlighting the depoliticizing at stake. A priority here might be to explore 
the possibilities for de-development and economic democracy.10 
 
In the short term, we are all having to adapt to the new circumstances that we find 
ourselves in, whether that is strengthening flood defences in Britain, or fleeing 
drought affected areas in other parts of the world. However, given that ‘we must 
face the true terror of this moment’11 there will be limits to which such adaptation, 
                                            
8 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 500. 
9 Examples would include: John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark and Richard York, The 
Ecological rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth (New York: Monthly review Press, 
2010); Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of 
Global Warming (London: Verso, 2016); Jason Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life: 
Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital (London: Verso, 2015); Simon Dalby, 
Security and Environmental Change (Oxford: Polity, 2009; Christophe Bonneuil and 
Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene (London: Verso, 2016). 
10 There is an emerging literature including: Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: 
Explorations in Environment and Development (London: Zed, 1999); Frances 
Hutchinson, Mary Mellor and Wendy Olsen, The Politics of Money: Towards 
Sustainability and Economic Democracy (London: Pluto Press, 2002). 
11 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 500. 
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in the face of rapacious capitalism, will be possible. In short, how exactly are we 
supposed to restore social justice, save oceans and prevent climate chaos unless we 
face the complex systemic causes of our current malaise? The suggestion that we 
should take on board the top-down global governance perspective of the planetary 
boundaries framework12 and that it was ‘rightly advanced’ as ‘a new paradigm that 
integrates the continued development of human societies and the maintenance of 
the Earth system in a resilient and accommodating state’ is highly problematic.13 
Work on becoming more resilient and accommodating, reflects a depoliticising 
neoliberal perspective14 that overlooks historical patterns, causes and structures, 
and fails to consider contemporary patterns of resource extraction and offshoring.15  
 
Liberal Cosmopolitanism Redux 
 
Just when it seemed that global cosmopolitanism could find no way back after the 
discrediting of David Held and Tony Blair, the death of the Third Way and Cool 
Britannia not to mention the Iraq war, the disasters of intervention in Libya and 
Afghanistan and the long-awaited Chilcot Inquiry, here we are with a new global 
liberal mission. While Burke et al are concerned about being trapped in the prison of 
International Relations thought, and its ‘state-centric'16 image, they are not averse to 
totalizing global claims of governance and intervention, including those of the 
                                            
12 Will Steffen et al., ‘Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a 
Changing Planet’, Science 347, no. 6223 (2015). 
13 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 506. 
14  See further, Jonathan Joseph, ‘Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: a 
governmentality approach’, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and 
Discourses 1, no. 1, 2013: 38-52; Brad Evans and Julian Reid, Resilient Life: The Art of 
Living Dangerously (Cambridge: Polity, 2014); David Chandler, Resilience: The 
Governance of Complexity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014). 
15 John Urry, Offshoring (Cambridge: Polity, 2014). 
16 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 504. 
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‘planetary boundaries’ and ‘safe operating spaces’ of Earth system science.17 Under 
the securitizing claims of ‘global ecological collapse’18 the authors feel entitled to 
dismiss even the formal niceties of international law and diplomacy on the basis 
that: ‘The biosphere cannot be traded, divided or bargained away. It is not a 
product, nor a monetary or diplomatic artefact, amenable to state compromises and 
quantification.’ 19  In moralising tones, no different from those of liberal 
internationalist cheerleaders in favour of ‘humanitarian’ bombing campaigns and 
new Western protectorates for ‘global justice’, Burke et al spend no time considering 
what new violences are afforded and enabled in their call for new global governance 
bodies to ‘enforce and penalise violence – slow and fast – against nonhuman 
communities and ecologies’ as they seek to legislate for securing the planet against 
errant humanity: 
 
It is time to imagine a category that includes ‘crimes against biodiversity’: to 
expand international human rights law to take in precious species and 
ecosystems, and criminalise avoidable activities that do them grave harm… 
something akin to genocide or a crime against humanity… [For example,] we 
must consider how pods or communities of dolphins can be seen as 
analogous to a nation or ethnic group in international law.20  
 
In looking to the power of global institutions Burke et al continue a long line of 
liberal interventions on environmental issues,21 and we are by no means the first to 
raise the dangers of ecopolitical interventions institutionalising new legal and 
                                            
17 Ibid, 504-6. 
18 Ibid, 500. 
19 Ibid., 510. 
20 Ibid., 516. 
21 See, for example, Lorraine Elliott, The Global Politics of the Environment (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave, 2004); John Vogler, Climate Change in World Politics ((Basingstoke, Palgrave, 
2016); Oran Young, On Environmental Governance: Sustainability, Efficiency and Equity 
(London, Routledge, 2016) 
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political inequalities.22 It is the fact that the potentially problematic nature of these 
proposals is not reflected upon that is most shocking about this Manifesto and its 
claims to be dealing with the ‘planetary real’.23 
 
Having their cake and wishing to eat it too, Burke et al seamlessly vacillate between 
calling for the reform of existing institutions to make them ‘fit for purpose’ and 
declaring goals so vital that they are beyond political negotiation and legal 
constraints. However, for their prime practical proposal, that coal should be a 
controlled substance they return to a staple of Liberal International Relations: the 
efficacy of international law to control the actions of states. ‘The 2015 Paris 
Agreement gave us hope’, the authors say, despite an admission that it contained 
‘no firm and enforceable plans’.24 While Liberals will hold to the line that ‘most 
states obey most law most of the time’, both those at the Realist side of the 
spectrum and the Marxist wing of International Relations are sceptical about the 
efficacy of international law. This is especially the case when the interests of the 
most powerful states are involved, which they are when it comes to the production 
of energy.25  In fact, rather than these new treaties being ignored or weakly 
implemented (a risk which the authors recognise)26 there is an obvious danger that 
                                            
22  Robyn Eckersley, ‘Ecological Intervention: Prospects and Limits’, Ethics & 
International Affairs 21, no. 3, (2007): 293–316; Rosaleen Duffy, ‘Waging a war to 
save biodiversity: the rise of militarized conservation’, International Affairs 90, no.4, 
(2014): 819–834; Paul Robbins and Sarah A Moore, ‘Ecological anxiety disorder: 
diagnosing the politics of the Anthropocene’, Cultural Geographies 20, no.1, (2013): 
3-19. 
23 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 501; 502; 512; 520; 521. 
24 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 503. 
25  Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law’ The 
American Journal of International Law 34, no. 2 (1940): 260-84; China Miéville, 
Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International Law (London, Pluto Press, 
2006). 
26 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 515. 
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new cosmopolitan international law will further reinforce international inequalities 
between the haves and have-nots.27 The fact that the Manifesto authors fail to 
reflect on the built-in inequalities reproduced through such legislation is reflected in 
the fact that they use the analogy with the controversial Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Conventions (‘the poor man’s choice of WMD’)28 as an argument in 
support of their advocacy for a Coal Convention ‘on the basis that coal is a profound 
and ongoing threat to global health and security’.29 
 
We would certainly agree that the burning of coal is deeply damaging to the 
environment. This was a point that James Hansen made several years ago.30 Our 
argument is that attempting to control this through International Law is unlikely to 
be effective or to ameliorate planetary inequalities. It could be pointed out, for 
example, that certain drugs are controlled substances, but the trade in illegal drugs is 
one of the largest global markets. A related point is why stop with coal? Why not 
oil?31 There are many other practices that are also damaging to the environment and 
produce large amounts of greenhouse gases, with industrialised agriculture being a 
significant contributor – particularly in relation to meat and dairy production, but 
also linked to production of fertilisers, and to the transport of produce across the 
globe. 
                                            
27 Already indicated in the Manifesto's sceptical view of developing and postcolonial 
state claims for ‘equitable carbon space to achieve sustainable development', Burke 
et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 509-10. 
28 See, for example, Tughral Yamin, ‘Chemical & Biological Weapons: Positions, 
Prospects and Trends, Policy Perspectives 10, no. 1 (2013): 147-159 
29 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 515. 
30 James Hansen, ‘Coal-fired power stations are death factories. Close them’ The 
Guardian, 15 February 2009, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/feb/15/james-hansen-power-
plants-coal. 




Likewise, Burke et al see legal process as the way to address ecological damage and 
ecocide. 32  Yet how much evidence is there to support the view that legal 
instruments provide anything to halt large-scale ecological issues – particularly when 
there are financial interests at stake? While decrying the capacities of the 
‘diplomacy’ of the UN, instead: 
 
We suggest the creation of an ‘Earth System Council’ with the task of action 
and warning – much like the current UN Security Council – that would 
operate on the basis of majority voting with representation of Earth systems 
cientists, major ecosystems, species groups, and states.33 
 
Suggesting that an ‘Earth System Council’ might be effective in decreasing 
environmental insecurity, given that it is cast as a parallel to the UN Security Council, 
is an odd suggestion, to say the least, particularly for authors who claim to be against 
the elitist and top-down model of governance. The implicit assumption that 
technocrats and advocacy groups can mobilise with only the need for a minority of 
states’ support appears to provide a new legitimacy to global liberal ‘coalitions of the 
willing’ (it is obviously unlikely that coercive action could be taken against more 
powerful states). This move is even more worrying in connection with the 
securitizing claim that ‘diplomacy as an institution, is failing’, 34 carrying potent 
reminders of the Blair years and the claims that international law needs to bow to 
cosmopolitan justice.35 Instituting global governance in ‘firm and enforceable’ ways, 
as if there were universal solutions that could be imposed from above, is a recipe for 
authoritarianism and new hierarchies and exclusions. As Walter Mignolo and others 
have noted, ‘all existing cosmopolitan projects rest on the hubris of the zero point’ 
                                            
32 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 515 
33 Ibid, 516. 
34 Ibid., 509. 
35 See Chandler, ‘New Rights for Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the Critique of 
State Sovereignty’, Political Studies 51, no. 2 (2003): 339-356. 
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with the elitist assumption that the authors have some objective or scientific 
position outside a particular time and space, and thereby operating ‘without 
questioning the very imperial epistemic foundations of cosmopolitan claims’.36 
 
Agency and Abstraction 
 
Burke et al argue for a ‘global ethics’, which ‘must respond to mass extinction’,37 
though what this might comprise and how it would develop are not addressed here. 
What is the basis of their new ethics? Which established political or philosophical 
traditions might we draw on that ‘embrace worldness’? The use of these terms 
including ‘planet politics' is all so grand. While it may sound critical to desire a ‘global 
ethics’ that confronts the issue of mass extinction and ecological damage, this will 
only emerge from action in the plural political contexts of the real world and cannot 
be wished into existence in the abstract. There are no ‘planet politics’, and the use of 
such terms reflects a top down, universalist or ‘God’s eye’ perspective associated 
with International Relations thinking in general and liberal, hierarchical, forms of 
global governance in particular. We are by no means the first to argue that global or 
planetary rhetoric is more likely to reinforce international hierarchies of power than 
to challenge them.38  
 
Planetary politics without any understanding of agency can only be a call for elite 
                                            
36 Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial 
Options (London: Duke University Press, 2011), 262 
37 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 516. 
38 In fact, the birth of the discipline of IR is often seen to lie with EH Carr’s scathing 
critique of global ethics, see his recently reissued The Twenty Years’ Crisis: 1919-
1939 (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2016); see also, Craig Calhoun, ‘The Class 
Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing 
Cosmopolitanism’, South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 4 (2002): 869-897; Anthony 
Pagden, ‘Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism’, 
Constellations 7, no. 1 (2000): 3–22.  
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governance. Nothing sums this up better than Burke et al’s reactionary view that 
human interests must be suborned to ecology, as if we could literally govern against 
and without democratic reasoning and debate. Apparently, the Anthropocene: 
 
…issues a profound challenge to politics: no longer is it legitimate to 
understand politics as the perennial clash between human preferences and 
interests, or indeed a bargaining of human interests against those of ecology. 
The planet is telling us that there are limits to human freedom; there are 
freedoms and political choices we can no longer have.39 
 
The desire to jump straight into the ‘limits to human freedom’ on the basis that this 
is what ‘the planet’ is ‘telling us’ would be comical if it were not articulated as a 
serious suggestion by well published and internationally respected critical theorists. 
The ‘manifesto’ is full of such elitist imperatives, facilitated by the uncritical 
abstraction of the human, whose political interests are seen as problematic and 
whose ‘freedoms and choices’ are to be limited. There is an uncritical endorsement 
of our contemporary condition in terms of the ‘Anthropocene’ wherein ‘humanity’ is 
constituted as problematic per se.40 Burke et al tell us that ‘transformations are 
afoot that are of humanity’s own making’.41 Yet this notion remains contested within 
geology rather than a self-evident truth.42 There are very significant oversights and 
risks in deploying a conflated conception of ‘humanity’43 and, of course, Burke et al 
are not the first commentators to problematically attempt to use the concept of the 
                                            
39 Ibid., 507. 
40 Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer, ‘The Anthropocene’, IGBT Newsletter 41 
(2000): 17-18. 
41 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 512. 
42 For example, Whitney J. Autin, and John M. Holbrook. ‘Is the Anthropocene an 
issue of stratigraphy or pop culture?’ Groundwork: The Geological Society of America 
22, no. 7 (2012): 60-61. 
43  Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, Posthuman International Relations: 
Complexity, Ecologism and Global Politics (London: Zed Books, 2011). 
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Anthropocene to engage in such conceptual conflation, suggesting that ‘humanity’ is 
a force of nature that is singular.44  
 
Some reflection at least might have been offered on the conceptual paradox of the 
Anthropocene which both emphasises the unprecedented entanglement of human 
activity on the planet with its species, eco-systems and landscapes while remaining 
wedded to a position of human universalism and exceptionalism.45 The question of 
what constitutes intervention and agency in the Anthropocene as posed and 
presented in the ‘Manifesto’ is human-centred and self-referential, appearing more 
like a last gasp attempt at reasserting a liberal anthropocentrism rather than a 
political or epistemological challenge to the disciplinary limits of IR. As Adrian 
Franklin argues, our histories of co-evolution raise serious questions for the ‘entire 
conceptual edifice of Liberal rationalism with its supremacist view of human agency 
against a largely passive and frail nature’.46  
 
What drove ‘us’ - the collective human - to be so destructive and dangerous a 
species?  As many have pointed out, we might characterise our current condition as 
one produced by the lifeways of a distinct social and geographically defined group; a 
subset of humanity. Thus terms such as the Capitalocene, the Anthrobscene, the 
Plantationocene47 have been used to make clear ‘who’ and what practices are 
                                            
44 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses’, Critical Inquiry 35 
(2009): 197-222. 
45 Florence Chiew, (2015) ‘The paradox of self-reference: sociological reflections in 
agency and intervention in the Anthropocene’ in Human Animal Research Network 
Editorial Collective (eds.) Animals in the Anthropocene: critical perspectives on non-
human futures. (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2015), 1-18. 
46 Adrian Franklin. ‘Ecosystem and Landscape: Strategies for the Anthropocene', in 
Human Animal Research Network Editorial Collective (eds.) Animals in the 
Anthropocene, 63-88. 
47 Jason W. Moore. Capitalism in the Web of Life. (London: Verso, 2015); Jussi 
Parikka, The Anthrobscene (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 
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responsible; while the difference filled Chthulucene understands us as enmeshed 
through tentacular practices and entreats us to ‘make kin’ as the mechanism for 
delivering multi-species eco-justice.48 Singular humanity is a dangerous trope when 
there is the aspiration for a political project that ‘will necessarily involve agonism 
and conflict’ and ‘new forms of cooperation and ongoing contestation’.49  
 
But perhaps even more problematic than the erasure of socio-political distinctions in 
the liberal trope of the ‘human’ is the almost celebratory way the Burke et al seek to 
dethrone the human through constituting the ‘planet’, the planet’s ‘politics’ and 
what the planet is ‘telling us’ in its place. As Claire Colebrook has argued this type of 
liberal ‘posthumanism’ is actually ‘ultrahumanism’: ‘Humanism posits an elevated or 
exceptional “man” to grant sense to experience, then when “man” is negated or 
removed what is left is the human all too human tendency to see the world as one 
giant anthropomorphic self-organizing body.’50 The planet and what it is ‘telling us’ 
sounds very much like the ideal embodiment of liberal universalist ethics which the 
cosmopolitan theorists were touting in the 1990s on the back of liberal 
interventionist human universalism.  
 
A further element in this reinforcement of human exceptionalism is the rather odd 
notion that ‘the planet’ might have anything to ‘say’ to the collective homogenised 
human. What earth system science has emphasised from the 1970s is that the 
complex assemblage of multiple complex systems that make up ‘the planet’, does 
not ‘tell us’ anything or ‘ask’ anything from ‘us’. The planet is indifferent ‘to our 
reasons and our projects’. 51 Invoking Rosa Luxemburg (1916), Isabelle Stengers 
                                            
48  Donna Haraway, ‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: 
Making Kin.’ Environmental Humanities 6. (2015): 159-165. 
49 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 507. 
50  Claire Colebrook, Death of the Posthuman: Essays on Extinction, Volume 1 
(London: Open Humanities Press, 2014), 164. 
51 Isabelle Stengers, In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism (London: 
Open Humanities Press, 2015), 47. 
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argues that our challenge once again is to face ‘the coming barbarism’ in the face of 
‘the intrusion of Gaia’. Luxembourg’s powerful invective against imperialist warfare 
saw humanity at a crossroads of resistance. The cause, capitalism, is ‘dishonoured, 
wading in blood and dripping with filth… Not as we usually see it, playing the roles of 
peace and righteousness, of order, of philosophy, of ethics - but as a roaring 
beast…’.52 Like Luxembourg, Stengers argues that we are not facing an oncoming 
crisis but operating within one. In 2016 as in 1916, the machine of capitalism 
continues to be radically irresponsible and our political guardians tinker very lightly 
with its imperatives. It is as indifferent to the vulnerability of the living as ‘the planet' 




Let us be clear, Burke et al are not establishing the ‘End of IR’, or anything remotely 
like it, on the basis of the challenges of the Anthropocene. Quite the opposite, they 
have great confidence in international political guardianship. Their ‘Planetary 
Manifesto’ seeks to give IR a new framework of meaning through the call to 
collective action given by the overwhelming threat of the Anthropocene, read as 
planetary extinction. As we have stated above, this desire to overcome the national 
and to reconstitute the ‘planetary’ is little more than a revival of liberal global 
cosmopolitanism of the 1990’s except now the problem to be dealt with is 
environmental abuses and planetary crimes rather than human rights abuses and 
war crimes. 
 
In a follow-up piece to the Manifesto, Burke and Fishel spell out their concerns more 
clearly: 'We believe new international institutions and laws are needed, with one 
fundamental purpose: to give a voice to ecosystems and non-human forms of life.’53 
                                            
52  Rosa Luxemburg, The Junius Pamphlet (1916), Available at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1915/junius/  
53 Burke and Fishel, ‘Politics for the planet: why nature and wildlife need their own 
seats at the UN’, The Conversation, 30 June 2016. Available at: 
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They describe the Manifesto as a challenge to the existing international mechanisms 
'too focused on interstate bargaining and human interests’ and focus on three key 
international reforms: a coal convention, an Earth system council, and a new 
category of “crimes against biodiversity”.  
 
They propose a system of top-down global regulation that would make the global 
cosmopolitan ideologues of the 1990s envious. At the top of the tree, the Earth 
system council would function much like the UN Security Council. It would, in effect, 
be an ‘ecological security council’ involving representation from permanent member 
states and representatives of new ‘eco-regions’ which ‘would be represented by a 
democratic assembly and have a constitution focused solely on the preservation and 
repair of its ecology’. ‘Crimes against Biodiversity’ would be tougher than current 
‘international laws that punish genocide, our suggested law would not require proof 
of intent to commit the crime, but merely a strong link between the activity and the 
destruction of biodiversity or industrial and systemic harm to animals’. 
 
While the Manifesto authors claim that they seek to fire a new ‘political imagination’ 
and to bring a ‘new urgency’ that is beyond ‘politics as usual’,54 the problem is less 
that the claims are utopian than that they are a recipe for reinforcing the disciplinary 
hierarchies just when they appear to be eroding. The ‘Manifesto’ faces exactly the 
same problems as those already rehearsed in the critiques levelled against the global 
cosmopolitan theorists: as long as we live under capitalism the measures argued for 
would never succeed or, if they did, they would only be used selectively to reinforce 
dominant power relations. As Drucilla Cornell and Stephen Seely have noted 
recently, we need to be extending human freedoms rather than seeking to 
bureaucratically and hierarchically to limit them. The threats of global extinction and 
global warming should not be used to pose a ‘forced choice’ of ‘the planet’ or 
                                                                                                                             
https://theconversation.com/politics-for-the-planet-why-nature-and-wildlife-need-
their-own-seats-at-the-un-59892.  
54 Burke et al, ‘Planet Politics’, 500. 
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‘politics’.55 Giving up on the human (of liberal modernity) does not necessarily imply 
that we give up on humanist aspirations for radical change and revolutionary 
possibilities and install global courts and legislators to act as enlightened overlords, 
squashing debate and democracy on the basis that they can hear ‘what the planet is 
telling us’ to do. 
 
Thus, the greater concern for us, of course, is the real impact of such a Manifesto: an 
elitist and managerialist assault on the political imagination, which has little to do 
with academic discussion and debate about whether and how to go ‘beyond IR’ or 
beyond modernist constructions of the human subject. This is why, when you scratch 
the surface, what is revealed is actually an anti-political manifesto: a call for the 
abolition of politics. In their demand for urgent action on universal moral grounds 
any attempt to discuss the stakes involved are sidelined rather than encouraged. 
Therefore, it is little surprise that, in their recent piece, Burke and Fishel blithely 
conclude: 'We are aware that these are radical ideas that raise significant political 
and legal complexities.... Planet Earth needs unprecedented politics for 
these unprecedented times.’ Against this position, we would suggest a ‘Non-
Manifesto for the Capitalocene’, one that encourages debate rather than closing 
down discussion with calls for focusing on establishing new legal and institutional 
frameworks of global security governance.  
 
While the term ‘Anthropocene' has entered common usage, we are concerned that 
its use can confuse the issues rather than illuminate them.56 The term once again 
puts an emphasis on the ‘anthropo’, the human. And while Crutzen and Stoermer 
justifiably sought to draw attention to the human impact on the planet, there is a 
                                            
55 Drucilla Cornell and Stephen Seely, The Spirit of Revolution: Beyond the Dead Ends 
of Man (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), 6. 
56 We would concur with Donna Haraway that more than one name is needed to 
describe the current era. See Donna Haraway, ‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, 
Plantationocene, Chtulucene: Making Kin’, Environmental Politics 6, no. 6 (2015): 
160.  
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danger that this reinforces the view of the human as all-powerful and separate from 
the rest of nature. Furthermore, it is not the ‘human’, that is the cause of the 
impacts on the rest of nature, but a specific subset of the human, living within a 
particular form of social organisation. Yet, as Stengers reminds us, the planet does 
not discriminate. The specific subset of the human and their ways of life will not be 
somehow targeted by planetary feedback loops. Rather, it is the most vulnerable 
humans and other animals who will be and are already bearing the first effects of the 
intrusion of Gaia. As Roy Scranton puts it ‘We’re fucked. The only questions are how 
soon and how badly’. 57 
 
In emphasising a ‘Non-Manifesto for the Capitalocene’, we would, first, refuse to 
rush to support global securitising measures of any sort, any more than we would 
support state declarations of ‘states of emergency’ or ‘emergency powers’. Second, 
we think that politics cannot and should not be reduced to ‘the preservation and 
repair of ecological systems’. It is a shame that the ‘Planetary Manifesto’ forces 
debate on to the technical terms of what steps should or could be taken by global 
(planetary) governance bodies and how feasible any such establishment of these 
bodies might be and their political consequences. Intellectually this discussion is no 
less problematic than debating earlier ideas for world government or global 
governance in the past and we are not the first authors to highlight its ‘deeply 
authoritarian and de-politicising tendencies’.58  
 
The Capitalocene and the End of IR 
 
The proposal of a ‘Non-Manifesto’ is purely a heuristic device to make clear that we 
definitely do not want to engage in the debate on the policy-making terms set by 
                                            
57 Roy Scranton, Learning to Die in the Anthropocene (San Francisco, City Light Books, 
2015), 16. 
58 Jeremy Baskin, ‘The Ideology of the Anthropocene’, Melbourne Sustainable Society 
Institute (MSSI) Research Paper, 3, (University of Melbourne: MSSI, 2014), 15; see 
also Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene. 
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Burke et al. It is not a call for inaction. However, the idea of the ‘Non-Manifesto’ 
flags up the demand that we make a refusal: a refusal to fall back into reinforcing the 
international arena as the source of politics and policy-making. The Capitalocene 
actually makes a major challenge to IR, one that is not taken at all seriously by Burke 
et al: it challenges the possibility of governing from the top-down through 
questioning the modernist understanding of the world. For all their talk of the 
'complex enmeshment of human and non-human life in the planetary biosphere’, 
Burke et al demonstrate little awareness of the consequences of this embeddedness 
for the policy-making they suggest or what is at stake for the discipline of IR itself. 
 
IR is a discipline concerned with policy-making - the policy-making of the inter-state 
sphere and the projection of policy intentions in the international arena. Until the 
1990s, this was a fairly minor academic concern and domestic politics and the 
discipline of political theory were seen as much more important. IR as a discipline 
boomed in the 1990s as the barriers between the domestic and the international 
appeared to be blurring (this is what led some academics to think that the days of 
the national state were over and the future was that of global governance). 
However, the fantasy of reproducing the state at the global level failed and what we 
witnessed was not the homogenising of the liberal order globally but rather the 
implosion of this order. 
 
In short, the discussion of ‘globalisation’ in IR in the 1990s was seen to be merely 
about the nature of the state, its borders and capacities, rather than liberal 
modernist frameworks per se. Today it is clear that the Capitalocene is globalisation 
'with bells on’, that is, the Capitalocene raises the prospect of the end of all the 
liberal binaries, particularly that between culture and nature. It is in many ways 
ironic that Burke et al treat the Anthropocene as if it is merely a rerun of 
globalisation (given the urgency of global warming and species extinction) rather 
than understanding that the impact of the Anthropocene/Capitalocene is actually 
much more radical. 
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The radicalism of the Capitalocene could be described in terms of the difference 
between the ontic and the ontological in Heidegger. The ontic level concerns the 
types of objects which make up, in this case, the subjects of International Relations, 
individuals, states, NGOs, TNCs, etc; under globalisation there was a shift at this 
level, states seemed less important, NGOs and other non-state actors seemed more 
important, but nothing was drastically at stake in the discipline, even if some people 
chose to call IR ‘global studies’ the subject matter and the theories were essentially 
the same. The Capitalocene heralds a change at the ontological level, at the level of 
how we understand what constitutes the subject matter itself. 
 
If the Capitalocene promises the end of the culture/nature divide, policy-making and 
policy institutions can no longer work in their traditional liberal modernist ways. 
Essentially we no longer understand nature to be separate, outside, external to us, 
somehow bound by fixed laws of repetition and strict linear causality. In which case, 
we no longer understand humans as separate and above nature, able to govern, 
control and direct it. Making policies in the Capitalocene then would make Burke et 
al’s recipes for global governance especially ridiculous or counterproductive: the 
Anthropocene is all about flux, multiplicities, feedback loops and interactions. It is 
about the limits of modern science and top-down governance and fantasies of 
control. This is precisely why the Capitalocene spells the end of IR while Burke et al’s 
‘Planetary Manifesto’ can only appear as a last gasp attempt to save IR. 
 
The need for a change in our ways of thinking about the world has been signalled by 
a range of thinkers both within and outside of IR. Drawing upon these ideas might 
provide ways of conceptualising ‘the end of IR’. Bruno Latour has been at the 
forefront of thinking about relations between the human and non-human, and of 
ways of incorporating the non-human into political processes.59 In his keynote 
address, given at the same conference that Burke et al first presented their 
manifesto, Latour argued against the very notion of sovereignty and geopolitics that 
                                            
59 See, in particular, Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Hemel Hempstead: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993); Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004). 
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underpins liberal cosmopolitan responses to the current ecological crisis. He notes 
that ‘the return of natural entities such as CO2 into politics thus offers an excellent 
occasion to purge the notion of sovereignty of the odd physics that had been 
inserted into it in earlier days’.60 In other words, there is a need for a complete re-
think of how we understand sovereignty, with implications for how to confront the 
environmental crisis. 
 
Drawing on Latour’s work, Anna Agathangelou also highlights IR’s ‘failure and denial 
of environmental questions or political ecology’.61 The discipline of IR she argues 
limits our capacity to consider ourselves as agents of change. Despite her 
sympathetic reading of Burke et al, we would argue that their proposals reproduce 
exactly the same feeling of incapacity.62 In responding to this failure and denial, she 
points to the possibilities for re-thinking agency to avoid such an incapacity in 
particular drawing on alternate cosmologies and postcolonialism.63 
 
As an alternative to the top-down approach signalled by ‘Planet Politics', we would 
like to suggest a bottom-up process which seeks to challenge the fundamentals of 
the contemporary situation. Our use of the term Capitalocene signals our view of a 
link between capitalism as a form of social organisation and the ecological, political 
and economic crises that we currently confront. We foresee no end to these crises 
within capitalism. This is why we question the policies suggested by Burke et al 
which not only fail to engage with the underlying issues but can only act as a 
                                            
60 Bruno Latour, ‘Onus Orbis Terrarum: About a Possible Shift in the Definition of 
Sovereignty’, Millennium 44, no. 3 (2016): 320. Note that this is a somewhat different 
presentation from his keynote at the conference. 
61 Anna M. Agathangelou, ‘Bruno Latour and Ecology Politics: Poetics of Failure and Denial in 
IR’, Millennium 44, no. 3 (2016): 321-347. 
62 Agathangelou, ‘Bruno Latour’, 343-4. 
63 Mark Jackson, ‘Composing Postcolonial Geographies: Postconstructivism, Ecology and 
Overcoming Ontologies of Critique’, Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 35, no. 1 
(2014): 72-87; Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, ‘Exchanging Perspectives: The Transformation of 
Objects into Subjects in Amerindian Ontologies’, Common Knowledge 10, no. 3 (2004): 463-
484. 
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palliative, not a remedy. Unfortunately, as the social experiments in Communist 
Russia and China demonstrated, capitalism does not have a monopoly on either 
exploitation or environmental degradation. Assessments of alternative forms of 
social organisation are a necessary but not sufficient direction to explore. 
 
At a more fundamental level, there is a need for a change in human consciousness. 
Richard Falk has recently written about the need to develop a ‘postmodern global 
imaginary', a view that takes ‘much fuller account of the wellbeing of the whole (the 
world) as well as remaining attentive to the viewpoint of the parts (the states)’. 64 
Theodor Adorno spoke in similar terms when in relation to the development of a 
‘self-conscious global subject'.65 The point where we differ from the ‘Planetary 
Manifesto’ is in not refusing to put social change at the top of the agenda. The 
‘Manifesto’ is a programme of global governance, one that accepts the appearances 
of the world and argues that we should obey what ‘the planet’ is ‘telling us’. For us, 
this is archetypal liberal governance, where Burke et al seek to revive the discipline 
of IR on the basis of a conceptual framework that re-orients thought and practice in 
response to the Anthropocene's destabilising effects.   
 
For the authors of the ‘Manifesto’, we need to suborn the human to the planetary 
governance of elites in the name of the Anthropocene. We need to sacrifice 
democracy, debate and political struggle in order to prosper within a catastrophic 
horizon of planetary extinction. From this perspective, the relation between politics 
and the Anthropocene is a profoundly depoliticizing one. Politics is in fact reduced to 
responding to and managing what are understood to be the consequences of 
previous human actions. Governing never starts a process with goals or aims at 
transformation and instead is reactive and responsive rather than a matter of 
initiation, of beginnings, of creativity. While agential powers of creativity are 
projected to the world, the human is reduced to, at best, following the instructions 
                                            
64 Richard Falk, Power Shift: On the New Global Order (London, Zed, 2016), 134. 
65 Theodor Adorno, ‘Progress’, in Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, ed. 
Theodor Adorno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 144. 
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given by the world. As Levi Bryant notes, this subordination to the whole would 
leave ‘Gaia’ as ‘either a fascist or a totalitarian’.66 This we suggest is precisely the 
problem of the Manifesto. 
 
Rather than this approach, we consider that a manifesto for living in an age of 
catastrophe requires different responses. One necessary response is to acknowledge 
the tragedy of our times, to take on board that catastrophe is already here and that 
we live in times of extinction and crises that are and will be profoundly 
transformative.67 Second, is to retain and extend our practices of critical analysis and 
politics where we need to continue to demonstrate the responsibility of particular 
forms of social organisation for our currently precarious condition. There are, in fact, 
many possibilities whereby a liberating and emancipatory perspective can be 
generated from the entanglements of the Anthropocene/Capitalocene, which, 
following some critical decolonial, feminist, queer and posthuman approaches, 
enables the dethronement of Enlightenment Man, without smuggling the ‘God trick' 
back into a human-less world, where politics has to be suborned to the planet. Third, 
we would rather seek inspiration in other ways of ‘renaturalising’ politics, ways 
which can be seen to offer creative possibilities and potentials. While we need to 
continue our critical analysis, political creativity has never been so urgent, and we 
need new research to unearth different ways of being in the world and to consider 
radical possibilities for different present and future life. What we need then, is to put 
research to work in, as the authors of the Manifesto for Living in the Anthropocene 
suggest – making ‘a stand for life!’.68 As Val Plumwood asserts, ‘If our species does 
                                            
66 Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (London: Open Humanities Press, 2011), 
277. 
67 See, for example, Deborah Bird Rose and Thom van Dooren (eds), ‘Unloved 
Others: Death of the Disregarded in the Time of Extinctions’, special issue, Australian 
Humanities Review, 50 (2011). 
68 Katherine Gibson, Deborah Bird Rose and Ruth Fincher (eds) Manifesto for Living 
in the Anthropocene (Brooklyn, NY: Punctum Books), iii. 
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not survive the ecological crisis it will probably be due to our failure to imagine and 
work out new ways to live with the earth’.69 
 
This three-fold response echoes the recent exhortation from Simon Springer to ‘Fuck 
Neoliberalism’. In unpacking what ‘fucking up’ means, Springer suggests it involves 
first, the expression of rage (through intellectual and practical political means such 
as critical research and protest); second, rejection (ignoring neoliberalism, or doing 
things differently) and third, ‘prefigurative politics’. The latter is most important in 
our current epoch and involves developing means ‘not to an end, but to future 
means’; it is an enactive politics in which we learn how to make new worlds in the 
shell of the old.70 
 
Unlike Burke et al we do not consider ‘Man’ and ‘Nature’ to be separable in a zero-
sum relationship, we would reject and go beyond this modernist binary. Going 
beyond IR is possible and also necessary once we radically redefine human agency as 
part of nature itself. For example, Hasana Sharp, drawing on the politics of Spinoza 
and Deleuze, suggests that awareness of our embodied and embedded relationships 
within the world enables governance through the cultivation of practical wisdom, 
seeking out ‘new sources of agency, connection, and energy’ rather than focusing on 
a problematic politics of top-down law-making and bureaucratic regulation.71 A 
‘posthumanist politics of composition and synergy’ would see the radical potential of 
appreciating contingency through an affective politics of enablement.72  
 
                                            
69 Val Plumwood, review of Deborah Bird Rose's ‘Reports from a Wild Country: Ethics 
for Decolonisation’, Australian Humanities Review, 42 (2007): 1. 
70 Simon Springer, ‘Fuck Neoliberalism’, ACME: An International Journal for Critical 
Geographies, 2016, 15(2): 287-8.  
71 Hasana Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 13. 
72 Ibid. 
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Similarly, Elizabeth Grosz suggests that appreciating the power of emergence - as a 
vital force of Life itself - enables and facilitates new forms of social organisation 
which would challenge the constraints of global liberalism. The naturalising of 
politics is only oppressive if nature is seen as fixed and linear rather than as lively 
excess and creativity. In her reading of Darwin, Bergson and others, she suggests 
that governing for the Anthropocene is not necessarily a matter of ‘a rational 
strategy for survival, not a form of adaptation, but the infinite elaboration of excess’ 
and experimentation.73  
 
In a world of becoming, beyond the binaries of ‘Man’ and ‘Nature’, it is possible to 
develop creative and enabling perspectives of relational embeddedness that see the 
contingencies of the Anthropocene as an opportunity rather than as a call for yet 
more constraints upon human freedom. We would extend the notion of freedom 
and emancipation beyond the human, in fact, such a change in thinking is not only 
possible but also occurring. As Philippe Descola has argued, there are at least four 
ways in which humans have conceived their relations with nature.74 We don’t argue 
that any one of these is ‘correct’, but make the simple point that no one way of 
conceiving human relations with the rest of nature is ‘natural’, essential or 
inevitable. In other words, these perspectives are the product of circumstances 
rather than fixed and as a result are open to change.  
 
It is also important to point to the existence of what Erika Cudworth has named 
‘posthuman communities’. Cudworth’s research has focussed on dog walking 
communities in Britain, but there are numerous other examples where the character 
of human/non-human relations have shown characteristics of ‘inclusivity, diversity, 
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(London: Duke University Press, 2011), 119. 
74 Philippe Descola, Beyond Nature and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2013). 
 26 
and reconstitution’.75 There is a considerable overlap here with Donna Haraway’s 
project of ‘making kin’ as a necessary response to ‘mass death and extinction’ and 
‘onrushing disasters’. 76  Examples would include human-nonhuman animal 
communities in times of conflict or fishing communities in Brazil that co-operate 
with dolphins and the honeyguide bird. We need different visions of what it means 
to be human and making our lives with multifarious other species. We need to re-
enact the relationship between economy and ecology, through community economy 
for example.77 We cite these examples to suggest that non-exploitative relations 
with other species are possible. Our research and our practice should be geared to 
exploring, encouraging, and developing these cases. This we believe opens the 




In sum, ‘Planet Politics’ makes for a confused read. There is a smattering of talk of 
social justice, yet ‘humanity’ is a homogenised entity. There is faith placed in 
international law and international organisations when there is also talk of weakness 
and of failure. States are depicted as arbitrary in the face of ecological collapse, yet 
the international system of states appears our only hope for a human future. There 
is mention of an ‘entangled’ existence, yet overwhelmingly this is a manifesto which 
understands ‘humanity’ (singular) as disembodied rather than co-constituted; and 
ultimately ‘the human’ is a sullying force on ‘the natural’. While we may well require 
an apocalyptic tone to provoke us out of slumber, there is a familiar tale 
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underpinning talk of our past, present and future here. Man was created and he 
made the world in his own image. In the process he fell, and he sullied paradise. Can 
he save himself at the end of days by renouncing coal and through the redemptive 
power of international agreements?78 
 
On that note, however, we could do with a bit of panache and fervour and, 
goddammit, some humour. Burke et al’s Manifesto is a rather limp call to arms. 
Where is the rhetorical flourishing of ‘fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of 
ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions’ being ‘swept away’, by the 
juggernaut of capital; 79  trampling the world, dripping blood? Where is the 
provocation of a ‘dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel 
heteroglossia’80 or the bravado of a story of multispecies co-evolution and future 
flourishing ‘rooted in those canine bitches who got in the way of man making himself 
yet again in the Greatest Story Ever Told’?81 The violence of making live and letting 
die surely needs decrying with a bit more verve; and our possible future at the edge 
of extinction needs a bit more joy and celebration of the ‘bling’ of life?82 While also, 
of course, carefully avoiding the ‘God trick’. 
 
We can agree that International Relations is inherently the discipline that has the 
responsibility for considering global processes, and that this is a responsibility it has 
thus far failed to shoulder. Yet this ‘Manifesto’ seems underpinned by an 
expectation that International Relations while currently failing the planet, may be of 
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some use in ‘saving’ it. This is indeed dreaming. Whatever might be ‘saved’, the 
discipline of IR will have little if anything to do with it. The discipline’s emergence as 
the handmaiden of political theory (with all the modernist binaries, including those 
of inside/outside, subject/object, cause and effect) makes IR particularly unsuited for 
dealing with the entanglements of the Anthropocene/Capitalocene. Where the 
globalisation of the 1990s undermined political theory’s state-centredness, the 
Anthropocene/Capitalocene of the 2010s similarly rings the death-knell for Burke et 
al’s human-centred global liberalism. 
 
What we don’t need at the present time is a ‘planet politics’ based on diktat and 
wedded to a Liberal account of International Relations. Rather, we need a concerted 
assault on the systemic practices, institutions and imperatives of dominatory power 
which have contributed to a condition of crisis. What we also require is the 
exploration of ideas from outside the disciplinary prison. These may help us in the 
task of building networks of reciprocity across social, cultural and species distinctions 
– of kin-making, of making space for the possibility of life in capitalist ruins.83 If we 
are prisoners, it is because we choose to be, and that appears to be the choice that 
Burke et al have made.  
 
Thus we advocate a Non-Manifesto for the Capitalocene. Even a Non-Manifesto 
might make use of a rallying cry, and Springer’s railing against Neoliberalism fits our 
purposes well. So, fuck the Capitalocene and  
 
Fuck the hold it has on our political imaginations. Fuck the violence it 
engenders. Fuck the inequality it extols as a virtue. Fuck the way it has 
ravaged the environment. Fuck the endless cycle of accumulation and the 
cult of growth.84  
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Let us find new ways of making life with others in the oncoming ruins of the 
Capitalocene; of making flourishing life for myriad creatures including those 
wonderful primates called human. This, certainly, will be beyond International 
Relations (as We Knew It). Let’s get out of jail. 
